| Update December 2011: A number of recent panel decisions allow insurance companies to transfer medical treatment into an existing MPN regardless of the underlying failure to first treat within the MPN: See Issues Booklet on MPNs |
| The question raised in some cases is what happens when some body parts are admitted and some denied as non-industrial and the applicant starts treating in a valid noticed MPN and then receives notice that they are denying certain body parts but treating the others in the MPN. Is the injured worker then required to get a second and third opinion within the MPN or can the injured worker seek treatment outside the MPN? An employer or its insurer is obligated to provide all medical treatment “that is reasonably required to cure or relieve the injured worker from the effects of his or her injury.” (Lab. Code, § 4600(a).) Section 4600(a) further provides: “In the case of his or her neglect or refusal to reasonably do so, the employer is liable for the reasonable expense incurred by or on behalf of the employee in providing treatment.” If the employer made an equivocal and inadequate offer of medical treatment, the employee could select his or her own physician and obtain reimbursement for the reasonable cost of reasonable self-procured medical treatment pursuant to section 4600. (Voss v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 583, 588 [516 P.2d 1377, 111 Cal. Rptr. 241] [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 56] So the answer would arguable be that when the MPN doctor denied certain body parts as non- industrial and the employer sends a letter of partial denial of injury that would be a communication that the employer would not be providing medical treatment for the denied body parts and an inadequate offer of medical treatment allowing the injured worker to treat outside the MPN for the denied body parts, depending on how the partial denial was worded. Of course then the utilization review and or medical legal process would take place to prove causation of the denied body parts. Therefore it depends on the facts of the case. According to the WCAB En Banc decision in Valdez v. Warehouse Demo Services/Zurich [ADJ7048296] where on 4/20/11, , held that where unauthorized medical treatment is obtained outside of a validly established and properly noticed MPN, the reports from these non-MPN doctors are inadmissible and may not be relied upon, the Applicant would not be able to treat outside the MPN and the medical reports would not be admissible to show causation or medical necessity. However, according to (Lab. Code, § 4600(a).) Section 4600(a) further provides: “In the case of his or her neglect or refusal to reasonably do so, the employer is liable for the reasonable expense incurred by or on behalf of the employee in providing treatment.”, and Voss v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 583, 588 [516 P.2d 1377, 111 Cal. Rptr. 241] [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 56] which held If the employer made an equivocal and inadequate offer of medical treatment, the employee could select his or her own physician and obtain reimbursement for the reasonable cost of reasonable self-procured medical treatment pursuant to section 4600. In addition the case of Granado v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 399, 404 [71 Cal. Rptr. 678, 445 P.2d 294]. Would no longer be effective in arguing treatment for non-industrial body parts, which held as follows: “So long as the treatment is reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of the industrial injury, the employer is required to provide the treatment, and treatment for nonindustrial conditions may be required of the employer where it becomes essential in curing or relieving from the effects of the industrial injury itself. The next issue would be if the PTP in the MPN denies certain body parts but admits others are the rules put forth in the En Banc Decision of Simmons v. California, 70 Cal. Comp. Cases 866 (W.C.A.B. 2005): which hold: “If in prescribing treatment for the disputed body part, the treating physician either explicitly or implicitly determines for the first time that the injury to the disputed body part is industrial, then utilization review is not appropriate. Instead, the defendant must initiate the AME/QME process within the deadlines established by section 4062(a)." Why would the Defendants get a medical legal as to causation if they’re the ones who benefit of the denial of causation? I believe the best answer would be held in Kenneth Grom vs. Shasta Wood Products (2004) 69 Cal. Comp. Cases 1567 (WCAB significant panel decision)]. Which held that even with the changes in the law, medical treatment is to cure and/or relieve from the effects of the injury. According WCAB En Banc decision in Valdez v. Warehouse Demo Services/Zurich [ADJ7048296] April 20, 2011, there exist two dissenting in part and concurring part opinions that have the same concerns as stated above as follows: CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION OF COMMISSIONER BRASS Assuming the existence of a validly established and properly noticed MPN, I concur in the result reached by my fellow Commissioners. I concur, under the facts of this case, that the applicant’s non-MPN medical reports are inadmissible, and that the defendant is not liable for the cost of such reports. I also concur in returning this matter to the trial level to determine the existence of a validly established and properly noticed MPN, as well as the issues of temporary disability and EDD’s lien. I dissent because there may be situations when an injured worker has good reasons to seek care outside even a validly established and properly noticed MPN, and thus, an appropriate exercise of authority under section 5703(a) would be to admit the reports of the non-MPN treating physician. In the instant case, it does not appear that applicant made a good faith attempt to treat within defendant’s MPN or to avail herself of the opportunities to change treating physicians and/or request another opinion. Instead, apparently on the advice of her attorney, she left the MPN after approximately three weeks. Such behavior should not be condoned. Consequently, if the existence of a validly established and properly noticed MPN is determined, I concur with the majority in finding the non-MPN reports inadmissible, thereby reversing the award of temporary disability benefits based on those reports. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this decision should be used to penalize injured workers when it would be in their best interest to seek care outside a validly established and properly noticed MPN. There may be a misdiagnosis, a lack of effective treatment, and/or an unreasonable delay in providing care. An employee seeking care outside a validly established and properly noticed MPN already has to pay for that treatment (Knight v. United Parcel Service (2006) 71 Cal.Comp. Cases 1423 (Appeals Board en banc); § 4605) and for the cost of any non-MPN reports. Furthermore, under the majority’s opinion, injured workers exercising their right under section 4605 to seek and pay for their own medical treatment outside the MPN are also foreclosed from receiving any compensation based on the non-MPN reports. Sections 4061 and 4062 require an injured worker to go outside the MPN to determine issues of temporary and permanent disability, if they are in dispute. According to the majority’s decision, the opinion of the non-MPN treating physician on those issues, regardless of its merits, would not even be considered. It must be emphasized that receiving reports into evidence only means that they will be considered. They may not be relied on unless they constitute substantial evidence and are the most persuasive indication of the injured worker’s condition. Section 5703(a) states that “[t]he appeals board may receive as evidence… [r]eports of attending or examining physicians,” and provides authority to admit the reports of non-MPN treating physicians. In situations which do not rise to the level of neglect or refusal to provide reasonable medical treatment, but where an injured worker has nevertheless appropriately sought care outside an MPN, the reports of the non-MPN treating physician should be admitted into evidence under section 5703(a) for consideration of any issue in dispute. /s/ Frank M. Brass___________________ FRANK M. BRASS, Commissioner CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION OF COMMISSIONER CAPLANE I concur with the majority that a defendant is not liable for the cost of medical reports obtained by an applicant outside of a validly established and properly noticed MPN, and that such reports are inadmissible under Labor Code section 4616.6 to resolve any dispute related to treatment and diagnosis. However, I dissent from the holding that these reports are inadmissible as to issues of compensation, i.e., temporary disability and permanent disability. Section 4616.6 states: “No additional examinations shall be ordered by the appeals board and no other reports shall be admissible to resolve any controversy arising out of this article.” (emphasis added.) This article is 2.3, “Medical Provider Networks” (MPNs), and is comprised of sections 4616- 4616.7. These sections deal exclusively with diagnosis and treatment, and thus, section 4616.6 precludes admissibility of reports obtained outside an MPN only on those issues. Here, however, the non-MPN medical reports were not admitted and relied on to resolve a dispute over diagnosis and treatment, but one of compensation, i.e., temporary disability, about which the MPN statutes are silent. Statutes governing temporary and permanent disability are contained in Article 3, sections 4650-4664 and are outside the scope of the MPN statutes under Article 2.3. The majority’s opinion also fails to give effect to sections 4605 and 5703(a). These sections were not repealed when the MPN statutes were enacted. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing law. Section 4605 states that “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall limit the right of the employee to provide, at his own expense, a consulting or any attending physicians whom he desires.” Thus, injured workers have the right to seek medical care outside a validly established and properly noticed MPN if they pay for that care. However, by excluding the reports of non-MPN doctors from evidence, the majority penalizes an applicant for exercising that right by effectively precluding him or her from receiving any benefits under the workers’ compensation system. The issue of entitlement to temporary and/or permanent disability indemnity is usually triggered by a medical report from the applicant’s treating doctor. Upon receipt of that report, a defendant can either pay the benefits in question, or object and follow the procedures set forth in sections 4061 and 4062 to resolve the dispute. Under the majority’s holding that reports of non-MPN physicians are not admissible for any purpose, a defendant when served with such reports can simply do nothing. Without an admissible medical report, the applicant has been deprived of the opportunity to even present a claim for temporary or permanent disability indemnity, and has essentially been removed from the workers’ compensation system. This is an unduly harsh result for exercising the right to seek treatment under section 4605, and certainly one not intended by the legislature. Moreover, an injured worker, who has exercised the right to seek treatment with a non- MPN doctor under section 4605, is already liable for both the cost of treatment and any non- MPN reports, and admitting such reports into evidence merely means they will be considered and not that they will necessarily be relied on to award compensation. Under the majority’s disposition, an applicant would have to return to the MPN before he or she is eligible to receive compensation, which may needlessly delay the resolution of a case and the provision of benefits to injured workers. Section 5703(a) provides that “[t]he appeals board may receive as evidence… [r]eports of attending or examining physicians.” As acknowledged by the majority, there is discretion under section 5703(a) which, like section 4605, refers to “attending” physicians, to admit into evidence the reports of non-MPN physicians on issues of compensation. The majority’s opinion, however, takes away the discretion of the WCJ under this section to admit the reports of non- MPN treating physicians on these issues in all cases where there is a validly established and properly noticed MPN. The majority has relied in part on Tenet/Centinela Hospital Medical Center v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Rushing) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1041 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 477] for its disposition here. Rushing, however, pre-dates the MPN statutes which were enacted under Senate Bill 899, and does not involve an applicant exercising the right to seek treatment under section 4605. While I do not condone the actions of an applicant’s attorney directing a client to treat with a non- MPN physician when a validly established and properly noticed MPN exists, an applicant nevertheless has the right to do so under section 4605 and should not be penalized for exercising that right. Moreover, in light of the specific restriction on admissibility to issues of diagnosis and treatment by section 4616.6, the discretion provided by section 5703(a) can be utilized to admit non-MPN reports on issues of compensation. The issue here is only the admissibility of the non-MPN doctor’s reports. Once admitted, the WCJ must decide if the reports constitute substantial evidence and the weight to assign to them. Where there is a validly established and properly noticed MPN, Article 2.3 gives MPN doctors exclusive control over issues of diagnosis and treatment. To extend that control to issues of compensation goes beyond the MPN statutory mandate and gives no effect to sections 4605 and 5703(a). Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the WCJ’s decision insofar as he properly exercised his discretion under section 5703 to admit the reports of the applicant’s non-MPN treating physician on the issue of temporary disability. I would, however, return this matter to the trial level for the newly assigned WCJ to address the defendant’s contention that these reports do not constitute substantial evidence. If so, the parties should then proceed under sections 4062(a) and 4062.2 to select either an agreed medical evaluator (AME) or a qualified medical evaluator (QME). /s/ Ronnie G. Caplane_____________________ RONNIE G. CAPLANE, Commissioner DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 4/20/2011 Although presently this case is up on appeal it is still and En Banc decision and must be followed until reversed as opposed to cases that are no En Banc. |