Psychiatric Injury
It can be sufficient if the medical evidence supports the conclusion that applicant's perceptions of workplace stress were objectively
reasonable.
In a psychiatric injury case, Verga does not require an applicant to testify to workplace stress. All Verga requires is that there be
objective evidence of workplace stress. As the Verga Court points out, the law used to be that an employee's claim of psychiatric injury
"may be founded upon an honest misperception of job harassment which interacts with a preexisting psychiatric condition so as to cause
job stress." (Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Bradley) (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 308 [47 Cal.Comp.Cases 460].)
(Bradley)
Thus, under old law, an employee's psychiatric injury claim could be based on a subjective misperception that his or her employment
was stressful. (Id.) However, as Verga emphasizes, after Bradley, the Legislature added Labor Code section 3208.3(b)(1), which
provides, "In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is compensable, an employee shall demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury."
As Verga observes, section 3208.3(b)(1) was intended to overrule Bradley by imposing more stringent requirements than the subjective
misperception standard. (Verga, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 187 [73 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 72].) But by requiring objective evidence of
workplace stress, Verga does not require the applicant to testify. It can be sufficient if the medical evidence supports the conclusion that
applicant's perceptions of workplace stress were objectively reasonable.
It can be sufficient if the medical evidence supports the conclusion that applicant's perceptions of workplace stress were objectively
reasonable.
In a psychiatric injury case, Verga does not require an applicant to testify to workplace stress. All Verga requires is that there be
objective evidence of workplace stress. As the Verga Court points out, the law used to be that an employee's claim of psychiatric injury
"may be founded upon an honest misperception of job harassment which interacts with a preexisting psychiatric condition so as to cause
job stress." (Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Bradley) (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 308 [47 Cal.Comp.Cases 460].)
(Bradley)
Thus, under old law, an employee's psychiatric injury claim could be based on a subjective misperception that his or her employment
was stressful. (Id.) However, as Verga emphasizes, after Bradley, the Legislature added Labor Code section 3208.3(b)(1), which
provides, "In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is compensable, an employee shall demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury."
As Verga observes, section 3208.3(b)(1) was intended to overrule Bradley by imposing more stringent requirements than the subjective
misperception standard. (Verga, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 187 [73 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 72].) But by requiring objective evidence of
workplace stress, Verga does not require the applicant to testify. It can be sufficient if the medical evidence supports the conclusion that
applicant's perceptions of workplace stress were objectively reasonable.
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